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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become an integral part of
modern-day security solutions for its capability of learning
very complex functions and handling ”Big Data”. However,
the lack of explainability and interpretability of successful AI
models is a key stumbling block when trust in a model’s pre-
diction is critical. This leads to human intervention, which
in turn results in a delayed response or decision. While there
have been major advancements in the speed and performance
of AI-based intrusion detection systems, the response is still
at human speed when it comes to explaining and interpreting
a specific prediction or decision. In this work, we infuse pop-
ular domain knowledge (i.e., CIA principles) in our model for
better explainability and validate the approach on a network
intrusion detection test case. Our experimental results sug-
gest that the infusion of domain knowledge provides better
explainability as well as a faster decision or response. In ad-
dition, the infused domain knowledge generalizes the model
to work well with unknown attacks, as well as open the path
to adapt to a large stream of network traffic from numerous
IoT devices.
1 Introduction
Most of the recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence
(AI), and more specifically Machine Learning (ML), have
come from complex non-linear models such as Deep Neu-
ral Networks, Ensemble Methods, and Support Vector Ma-
chines. These models are also known as ”black box” models
as they are complex to interpret and explain, which arises
from their inherent non-linear capabilities, multiple param-
eters, and very complex transformations. In addition, some
algorithms require a very large number of samples (i.e., large
training sets) to work efficiently, where it is very difficult
to figure out what the model learned from the dataset and
which portion of the data set has more influence on the out-
put (mle ).
Due to these challenges, the black box models lacks ex-
plainability and interpretability, ultimately resulting in a lack
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of trust in the model and prediction, as well as possibly
leading to a delayed human response/decision. This limita-
tion also involves ethical issues in a few sensitive domains
like finance (e.g., credit approval), health care (e.g., dis-
ease diagnosis), and security (e.g., identifying target). For
instance, AI and ML are becoming an integral part of secu-
rity solutions and defense. To mitigate the unethical use of
AI and eliminate biases from AI systems, the various gov-
ernments have started taking different precautionary initia-
tives. Recently, the European Union implemented the rule
of ”right of explanation”, where a user can ask an explana-
tion of algorithmic decision (Goodman and Flaxman 2017).
In addition, more recently the US government introduced
a new bill, the ”Algorithmic Accountability Act”, which
would require companies to assess their machine learning
systems for bias and discrimination, with a need to take
corrective measures (Wyden ). The U.S. Department of De-
fense (DoD) has identified explainability as a key stumbling
block in the adoption of AI-based solutions in many of their
projects. Their DARPA division has invested $2 billion on an
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) program (Turek ;
Rankin ).
Network intrusions are a common cyber-crime activity,
estimated to cost around $6 trillion annually in damages by
2021 (Doyle ). In order to combat these attacks, an Intru-
sion Detection System (IDS) is a security system to monitor
network and computer systems (Hodo et al. 2016). Research
in AI-based IDS has shown promising results (Hodo et al.
2016),(Shone et al. 2018),(Kim et al. 2016),(Javaid et al.
2016),(Li, Sun, and Wang 2012), and has become an inte-
gral part of security solutions due to its capability of learn-
ing complex, nonlinear functions and analyzing large data
streams from numerous connected devices. A recent survey
by (Dong and Wang 2016) suggests that deep learning-based
methods are accurate and robust to a wide range of attacks
and sample sizes. However, there are concerns regarding the
sustainability of current approaches (e.g., intrusion detec-
tion/prevention systems) when faced with the demands of
modern networks and the increasing level of human inter-
action (Shone et al. 2018). In the age of IoT and Big Data,
an increasing number of connected devices and associated
streams of network traffic have exacerbated the problem.
In addition, the delay in detection/response increases the
chance of zero day exploitation, whereby a previously un-
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known vulnerability is just discovered by the attacker, and
the attacker immediately initiates an attack. However, im-
proved explainability of an AI model could quicken inter-
pretation making it more feasible to accelerate the response.
Explainability is the extent to which the internal working
mechanism of the machine or AI system can be explained
in human terms. And interpretability is the extent to which
a cause and effect (i.e., understanding of what’s happen-
ing) can be observed within a system. In other words, in-
terpretability is a form of abstract knowledge about what’s
happening and explainability is about the detailed step-by-
step knowledge of what is happening (Montavon, Samek,
and Mu¨ller 2018),(Turek ). However, while some literature
treat interpretability and explainability as the same, they are
actually two different traits of a model. Just because a model
can be interpreted does not mean that it can be explained,
and explainability needs to go beyond the algorithm (Lipton
2016).
Explainability and interpretability of a model could be
achieved before, during, and after modeling. From the lit-
erature, we find that interpretability in pre-modeling (i.e.,
before modeling) is under-focused. (Miller 2018) argue that
explainability should incorporate knowledge from a differ-
ent domain such as philosophy, psychology, and cognitive
science so that the explanation is not just based on the re-
searcher’s intuition of what constitutes a good explanation.
However, we also find that the use of domain knowledge
for explainability is also under-focused. In this work, we in-
troduce a novel approach for an AI-based explainable intru-
sion detection and response system, and demonstrate its ef-
fectiveness by infusing a popular network security principle
(CIA principle) into the model for better explainability and
interpretability of the decision.
We use a recent and comprehensive IDS dataset (CI-
CIDS2017) which covers necessary criteria with com-
mon updated attacks such as DDoS, Brute Force, XSS,
SQL Injection, Infiltration, Portscan, and Botnet. We in-
fuse CIA principle in the model that provides a concise
and interpretable set of important features. Computer se-
curity rest on CIA principles, C stands for confidential-
ity—concealment of information or resources, I stands for
integrity—trustworthiness of data or resources, and A stands
for availability—ability to use the information or resource
desired (Matt and others 2006). For instance, security com-
promise in confidentiality could happen through eavesdrop-
ping unencrypted data, compromise in integrity could hap-
pen through an unauthorized attempt to change data, and
the compromise in availability could happen through the
deliberate arrangement of denial to access data or service.
We also convert the domain knowledge infused features into
three features C, I, and A by quantitatively computing com-
promises associated with each of those for each record. Out-
put expressed as these generalized and newly constructed
set of features provides better explainability with negligible
compromises in performance. We also found that general-
ization provides more resiliency against unknown attacks.
In summary, our contributions in this work are as follows:
(1) we demonstrate a method for the collection and use of
domain knowledge in an intrusion detection/response sys-
tem; (2) we introduce a way to bring popular security prin-
ciples (e.g., CIA principles) to aid in interpretability and ex-
plainability; (3) our experimental results show that infusing
domain knowledge into ”black box” models can make them
better explainable with little or no compromise in perfor-
mance ; and (4) domain knowledge infusion increases gener-
alizability, which leads to better resiliency against unknown
attack.
We start with a background of related work (Section 2)
followed by a description of our proposed approach, an in-
tuitive description of standard supervised algorithms, and an
overview of the dataset (Section 3) used in this work. In Sec-
tion 4, we describe our experiments, followed by Section 5
which contains discussion on results from the experiments.
We conclude with limitations and future work in Section 6.
2 Background
Research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is a re-
emerging field, after the earlier work of (Chandrasekaran,
Tanner, and Josephson 1989), (Swartout and Moore 1993),
and (Swartout 1985). Previous work focused on primarily
explaining the decision process of knowledge-based sys-
tems and expert systems. The classical learning paradigm
Explanation-Based Learning (EBL), introduced in the early
’80s, can also be regarded as a precursor of explainability.
EBL involves learning a problem-solving technique by ob-
serving and analyzing solutions to a specific problem (De-
Jong 1981), (Mitchell, Keller, and Kedar-Cabelli 1986). The
main reason for the renewed interest in XAI research has
stemmed from recent advancements in AI and ML and their
application to a wide range of areas, as well as concerns over
unethical use and undesired biases in the models. In addi-
tion, recent concerns and laws by different governments are
necessitating more research in XAI.
(Yang and Shafto 2017), use Bayesian Teaching, where a
smaller subset of examples is used to train the model instead
of the whole dataset. The subset of examples is chosen by
domain experts as the examples most relevant to the prob-
lem of interest. However, for this purpose, choosing the right
subset of examples in the real-world is challenging.
(Lei, Barzilay, and Jaakkola 2016) propose an approach
for sentiment analysis where a subset of text from the whole
text is selected as the rationale for the prediction. In addition,
the selected subset of text is concise and sufficient enough
to act as a substitute for the original text, and still capable of
making the correct prediction. Although their approach out-
performs available attention-based models (from deep learn-
ing) with variable-length input (e.g., a model for document
summarization) , it is limited to only text analysis.
When the explanation is based on feature importance, it is
necessary to keep in mind that features that are globally im-
portant may not be important in the local context, and vice
versa (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016). (Ribeiro, Singh,
and Guestrin 2016) propose a novel explanation technique
capable of explaining the prediction of any classifier (i.e.,
in the model agnostic way) in a locally interpretable model
(i.e., in the vicinity of the instance being predicted) around
the prediction. Their concern is on two issues: (1) whether
the user should trust the prediction of the model and act on
that, and (2) whether the user should trust a model to be-
have reasonably-well when deployed. In addition, they in-
volve human judgment in their experiment (i.e., human in
the loop) to decide whether to trust the model or not.
(Kim et al. 2017) propose a concept attribution-based ap-
proach (i.e., sensitivity to concept) that provides an inter-
pretation of the neural network’s internal state in terms of
human-friendly concepts. Their approach, Testing with CAV
(TCAV), quantifies the prediction’s sensitivity to the high di-
mensional concept. For example, a user-defined set of ex-
amples that defines the concept ’striped’, TCAV can quan-
tify the influence of ’striped’ in the prediction of ’zebra’ as a
single number. To learn the high dimensional concepts they
use a Concept Activation Vector (CAV) —CAVs are learned
from training a linear classifier that can distinguish between
the activations produced by a particular concept’s examples
and examples in any layer.
Most of these approaches try to find out how the predic-
tion deviates from the base/average scenario. Lime (Ribeiro,
Singh, and Guestrin 2016) tries to generate an explana-
tion by locally (i.e., using local behavior) approximating the
model with an interpretable model (e.g., decision trees, lin-
ear model). However, it is limited by the use of the only
linear model to approximate the local behavior. (Lundberg
and Lee 2017) propose ”SHAP” which unifies seven previ-
ous approaches: LIME (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016),
DeepLIFT (Shrikumar, Greenside, and Kundaje 2017), Tree
Interpreter (Ando ), QII (Datta, Sen, and Zick 2016), Shap-
ley sampling values (Sˇtrumbelj and Kononenko 2014),
Shapley regression values (Lipovetsky and Conklin 2001),
and Layer-wise relevance propagation (Bach et al. 2015) to
make the explanation of prediction for any machine learn-
ing model. While SHAP comes with theoretical guarantees
about consistency and local accuracy from game theory, it
needs to run many evaluations of the original model to es-
timate a single vector of feature importance (Lundberg ).
ELI5 also uses the LIME algorithm internally for explana-
tions. In addition, ELI5 is not truly model agnostic, mostly
limited to tree-based and other parametric or linear models.
Furthermore, Tree Interpreter is limited to only tree-based
approaches (e.g., Random Forest, Decision Trees).
AI-based IDSs have continued to show promising perfor-
mance (Hodo et al. 2016),(Shone et al. 2018),(Kim et al.
2016),(Javaid et al. 2016),(Li, Sun, and Wang 2012). (Shone
et al. 2018) propose an approach in combination of both
shallow (Random Forest) and deep learning (Auto Encoder),
capable of analyzing a wide range of network traffic, out-
performing mainstream Deep Belief Networks (DBN). In a
literature survey on traditional IDS vs deep learning IDS by
(Dong and Wang 2016), they suggest deep learning-based
methods provide better accuracy for a wide range of sam-
ples sizes and a variety of network traffic or attacks (Dong
and Wang 2016). However, in all of the previous work, there
are still long training times and a reliance on a human oper-
ator (Shone et al. 2018).
However, incorporating domain knowledge for explain-
ability has garnered little attention. Previously, we intro-
duced the concept of infusing domain knowledge (Islam et
al. 2019), albeit for bankruptcy prediction with a limited fo-
cus. (Miller 2018) have argued that incorporating knowledge
from different domains will provide better explainability. In
addition, (Kim et al. 2017) use the prediction’s sensitivity to
high dimensional concepts (e.g., the concept ’striped’ to ’Ze-
bra’) for explaining the prediction. Furthermore, both LIME
(Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016) and SHAP (Lundberg
and Lee 2017) use a simplified input mapping—mapping the
original input to a simplified set of input. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the models incorporate domain knowl-
edge with a focus towards better explainability and inter-
pretability. Although our proposed conceptual model comes
with a negligible compromise in accuracy, it comes with bet-
ter explainability and interpretibility, and scalability to big
data problems.
3 Methodology
Figure 1: Proposed Technique
3.1 Proposed Approach
The proposed approach consists of two components: a fea-
ture generalizer, which gives a generalized feature set with
the help of domain knowledge in two different ways; and an
evaluator that produces and compares the results from the
”black box” model for multiple configurations of features:
domain knowledge infused features, newly constructed fea-
tures from domain knowledge infused features, selected fea-
tures, and all features.
3.2 Feature Generalizer
The feature generalizer (Figure 1, top portion), takes orig-
inal features of the dataset (X1, X2, .... Xn ∈ X where X
is the set of all features) and infuse domain knowledge to
Table 1: Mapping of network attack with related component
of CIA principles
Attack Related component of CIA
DoS GoldenEye A
Heartbleed C
DoS hulk A
DoS Slowhttp A
DoS slowloris A
SSH-Patator C
FTP-Patator C
Web Attack C, I, A
Inflitration C
Bot C, I, A
PortScan C
DDoS A
produce/re-construct a concise and better interpretable fea-
ture set (X1’, X2’, ..... Xk’ ∈ X’ where X’ is the universal
set of original/transformed/constructed features, but here k
is much smaller than n) in two different ways:
Feature Mapping As stated earlier, we use CIA princi-
ples as domain knowledge, which stands for confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. We analyze all types of attacks
for associated compromises in each component of CIA prin-
ciples (see Table 1). The Heartbleed vulnerability is related
to a compromise in confidentiality as an attacker could gain
access to the memory of the systems protected by the vul-
nerable version of the OpenSSL. A Web attack (e.g., Sql in-
jection) is related to a compromise in confidentiality and in-
tegrity (e.g., read/write data using injected query), and avail-
ability (e.g., flooding the database server with injected com-
plex queries like a cross join). Infiltration attack is related to
a compromise in confidentiality as it normally exploits soft-
ware vulnerability (e.g., Adobe Acrobat Reader) to create a
backdoor and reveal information (e.g., IPs). Port scan attack
is related to a compromise in confidentiality as the attacker
sends packets with varying destination ports to learn the ser-
vices and operating systems from the reply. All DoS and
DDoS attacks are related to a compromise in availability as
it aims to hamper the availability of service or data. Further-
more, SSH patator and FTP patator are brute force attacks
and are usually responsible for a compromise in confiden-
tiality. Botnet (i.e., robot network—a network of malware-
infected computers) could provide a remote shell, file up-
load/download option, screenshot capture option, and key
logging options which has potential for all of the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability related compromises.
Furthermore, from the feature ranking of the origi-
nal dataset provider (Sharafaldin, Lashkari, and Ghorbani
2018), for each type of attack, we take the top three fea-
tures according to their importance (i.e., feature importance
from Random Forest Regressor) and calculate the mapping
(Table 2) with related compromises under CIA principles.
For example, the feature Average Packet Size is renamed as
Avg Packet Size - A where -A indicates that it is a key feature
for the compromise of availability (see Table 2). To get this
mapping between feature and associated compromises, we
first find the mapping between an attack and related com-
promises (from Table 1, formulated as Equation 2). In other
words, Formula 1 gives the name of the associated attack
from the feature name and Formula 2 gives associated com-
promises from the attack name. Thus, with the help of do-
main knowledge, we keep 22 features (see Table 2) out of a
total of 78 features. We will refer to these features as the do-
main features. The feature descriptions in Table 2 are taken
from the data processing software’s website (net ).
f(feature)→ attack (1)
f(attack)→ C, I, orA (2)
Feature Construction We also construct three new fea-
tures, C, I, and A, from the domain features by quantita-
tively calculating compromises associated with each of the
domain features. For that purpose, we calculate the correla-
tion coefficient vector of the dataset to understand whether
the increase in the value of a feature has a positive or nega-
tive impact on the target variable. We then convert the corre-
lation coefficient (a.k.a coeff ) vector V in to a 1 or -1 based
on whether the correlation coefficient is positive or negative
accordingly. We also group the domain features and corre-
sponding coeff tuple into three groups. Using formula 3, 4,
and 5, we aggregate each group (from C, I, and A) of do-
main features into the three new features C, I, and A. We
also scale all feature values from 0 to 1 before starting the
aggregation process. During the aggregation for a particular
group (e.g., C), if the correlation coefficient vector (e.g., Vi)
for a feature (e.g., Ci) of that group has a negative value,
then the value for that feature is deducted, and vice-versa if
positive. In addition, when a feature is liable for more than
one compromise, the feature value is split between the asso-
ciated elements of CIA principles.
C =
n∑
i=0
C iV i (3)
I =
n∑
i=0
I iV i (4)
A =
n∑
i=0
AiV i (5)
3.3 Evaluator
The task of the evaluator (Figure 1, bottom side) is to exe-
cute and compare the performance (in detecting malicious
and benign records) of four different types of models, as
follows: (1) using all features, (2) using selected features
(selection is done by feature selection algorithm), (3) us-
ing domain knowledge infused features, and (4) using newly
constructed features C, I, and A from domain knowledge in-
fused features. In addition, the evaluator performs the fol-
lowing two tests:
1. Explainability Test: The purpose of this test is to discover
the comparative advantages or disadvantages of incorpo-
rating domain knowledge in the experiment; and
Table 2: Mapping of feature with related component of CIA principles
Feature Description In top 3 features of attack Renamed feature
ACK Flag Count Number of packets with ACK SSH-Patator ACK Flag Count - C
Active Mean Mean time a flow was active before becoming idle DoS Slowhttp, Infiltration Active Mean - AC
Active Min Minimum time a flow was active before becoming idle DoS Slowhttp Active Min - A
Average Packet Size Average size of packet DDoS Avg Packet Size - A
Bwd IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in the backward direction DoS slowloris Bwd IAT Mean - A
Bwd Packet Length Std Standard deviation size of packet in backward direction DoS Hulk, DoS GoldenEye, DDoS,
Heartbleed, DoS Hulk
Bwd Packet Length Std - AC
Bwd Packets/s Number of backward packets per second Bot, PortScan Bwd Packets/s - CIA
Fwd IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in the forward direction DoS slowloris Fwd IAT Mean - A
Fwd IAT Min Minimum time between two packets sent in the forward direction DoS slowloris, DoS GoldenEye Fwd IAT Min - A
Fwd Packet Length Mean Mean size of packet in forward direction Benign, Bot Fwd Packet Length Mean - CIA
Fwd Packets/s Number of forward packets per second FTP-Patator Fwd Packets/s - C
Fwd PSH Flags Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets travelling in the for-
ward direction (0 for UDP)
FTP-Patator Fwd PSH Flags - C
Flow Duration Duration of the flow in Microsecond DDoS, DoS slowloris, DoS Hulk,
DoS Slowhttp, Infiltration, Heart-
bleed
Flow Duration - AC
Flow IAT Mean Mean inter-arrival time of packet DoS GoldenEye Flow IAT Mean - A
Flow IAT Min Minimum inter-arrival time of packet DoS GoldenEye Flow IAT Min - A
Flow IAT Std Standard deviation inter-arrival time of packet DDoS, DoS Slowhttp, DoS Hulk Flow IAT Std - A
Init Win bytes forward The total number of bytes sent in initial window in the backward direc-
tion
Web Attack Init Win Bytes Fwd - CIA
PSH Flag Count Number of packets with PUSH PortScan PSH Flag Count - C
Subflow Fwd Bytes The average number of packets in a sub flow in the forward direction Benign, SSH-Patator, Web Attack,
Bot, Heartbleed, Infiltration
Subflow Fwd Bytes - CIA
SYN Flag Count Number of packets with SYN FTP-Patator SYN Flag Count - C
Total Length of Fwd Packets Total size of packet in forward direction Benign, SSH-Patator, Web Attack,
Bot, Heartbleed, Infiltration
Total Length of Fwd Packets - CIA
2. Generalizability Test: The purpose of this test is to an-
alyze how different approaches perform in unknown or
unseen attack detection. We delete all training records for
a particular attack one at a time and investigate the perfor-
mance of the model on the same test set, which includes
records from unknown or unseen attacks. Details of these
tests are described in Section 4.
3.4 Algorithms
We use six different supervised algorithms for predicting
malicious records: one of those is a probabilistic classifier
based on Naive Bayes theorem, and the remaining five are
supervised ”black box” models. The algorithm descriptions
are taken from our previous work (Islam et al. 2019).
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) An Artificial Neural
Network is a non-linear model, capable of mimicking hu-
man brain functions to some extent. It consists of an input
layer, one or multiple hidden layer(s), and the output layer.
Each layer consists of multiple neurons that help to learn the
complex pattern. Each subsequent layer learns more abstract
concepts before it finally merges into the output layer.
Support Vector Machine (SVM) The Support Vector
Machine (SVM) was first introduced by (Boser, Guyon, and
Vapnik 1992) and has been used for many supervised classi-
fication tasks. In addition to linear classification, the model
can learn an optimal hyperplane that separates instances of
different classes using a highly non-linear implicit mapping
of input vectors in high dimensional feature space (i.e., ker-
nel trick) (Hooman et al. 2016). When the number of sam-
ples is too high (i.e., millions) then it is very costly in terms
of computation time.
Random Forest (RF) A Random Forest is a tree-based
ensemble technique developed by (Breiman 2001) for the
supervised classification task. In RF, many trees are gener-
ated from the bootstrapped subsamples (i.e., random sample
drawn with replacement) of the training data. In each tree,
the splitting attribute is chosen from a smaller random sub-
set of attributes of that tree (i.e., the chosen split attribute
that is the best among that random subset). This random-
ness helps to make trees less correlated as correlated trees
make the same kinds of prediction errors and can overfit the
model. In less correlated trees, a few trees may be wrong
but many others will be right and as a group the trees can
move in the right direction as the output from all the trees
are averaged for the final prediction.
Extra Trees (ET) Extremely Randomized Trees or Extra
Trees (ET) is a tree-based ensemble technique simialr to RF.
The only difference is in the process of splitting attribute se-
lections and determining the threshold (cutoff) value, both
are chosen in an extremely random fashion (Islam, Ghafoor,
and Eberle 2018). Similar to RF, a random subset of features
are taken into consideration for the split selection, but in-
stead of choosing the most discriminative cut off threshold,
ET cut off thresholds are set to random values. Thus, the best
of these randomly chosen values is set as the threshold for
the splitting rule (ens ) on a particular node. Unlike DT, RF
has multiple trees which leads to a reduced variance. How-
ever, bias is introduced, as a subset of the whole feature set is
chosen for each tree instead of all features. ET was proposed
by (Geurts, Ernst, and Wehenkel 2006), and has achieved a
state of the art performance in some anomaly/intrusion de-
tection research (Islam 2018), (Islam, Eberle, and Ghafoor
2018),(Islam, Ghafoor, and Eberle 2018).
Gradient Boosting (GB) (Friedman 2001), generalized
Adaboost to a Gradient Boosting algorithm to allow a vari-
ety of loss function. Here the shortcoming of weak learners
is identified using the gradient instead of highly weighted
data points as in Adaboost. Gradient Boosting (GB) is a
classifier/regression model in the form of an ensemble of
weak prediction models, such as Decision Trees. It works
sequentially like the AdaBoost algorithm, in that each sub-
sequent model tries to minimize the loss function (i.e., Mean
Squared Error) by paying special focus on instances that
were hard to get right in the previous model.
Naive Bayes (NB) Naive Bayes algorithm is based on
Bayes Theorem, which was formulated in the seventeenth
century. It is a supervised, simple, and comparatively fast
algorithm based on statistics. In a real-world problem, it is
unusual that all features are independent. However, Naive
Bayes assumes conditional independence among features
and surprisingly works well in many cases. It also requires
a small amount of training data to estimate the necessary
parameters (nai ). This assumption of Naive Bayes helps to
avoid lots of computations (e.g., computing the conditional
probability for each feature with others) and makes it a faster
algorithm. Besides, the avoidance of a conditional probabil-
ity calculation helps (the class conditional feature distribu-
tion can be independently estimated as one-dimensional dis-
tribution) in Big Data problems where the curse of dimen-
sionality is a concern. However, NB is a bad estimator of a
probabilty (Zhang 2004). We use the Bernoulli Naive Bayes
(Manning, Raghavan, and 2010) for our experiments where
each feature is assumed to be binary-valued.
3.5 Data
In this work, we use a recent and comprehensive IDS dataset
namely CICIDS2017, published in 2017, covers necessary
criteria with common updated attacks such as DoS, DDoS,
Brute Force, XSS, SQL Injection, Infiltration, Portscan,
and Botnet. In fact, this dataset is created to eliminates
the shortcomings (e.g., lack of traffic diversity and vol-
ume, lack of variety of attacks, anonymized packet infor-
mation, and out of date) of previous well known IDS dataset
such as DARPA98, KDD99, ISC2012, ADFA13, DEFCON,
CAIDA, LBNL, CDX, Kyoto, Twente, and UMASS since
1998. This is a labeled dataset containing 78 network traf-
fic features (some features are listed in Table 2) extracted
and calculated from pcap file using CICFlowMeter soft-
ware (Lashkari et al. 2017) for all benign and intrusive flows
(Sharafaldin, Lashkari, and Ghorbani 2018) . This new IDS
dataset includes seven common updated family of attacks
satisfying real-world criteria, also publicly available at here:
https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids-2017.html .
Each record of the dataset is labeled by the particular type
of attack. We make a new feature ’Class’, which is the tar-
get feature. We set the value of the ’Class’ attribute to 1 for
all records labeled as any of 14 types of attacks, as those
are malicious/intrusive, and set the value to 0 for the re-
maining records as those are benign. Following that, in the
whole dataset, there are total 2,830,743 records for 14 differ-
ent attacks, 2,273,097 are benign and 557,646 are malicious.
Approximately 24.5% of the records are malicious, giving
us an imbalanced dataset which impacts the performance
(e.g., bias to the class of majority samples) of some machine
learning algorithms. To overcome this problem, we use the
well-known oversampling technique SMOTE (Chawla et al.
2002) to oversample the minority class. In (Dong and Wang
2016), the author uses SMOTE to overcome the issue in
their empirical study on the comparison of traditional vs
deep learning-based IDS. SMOTE creates synthetic samples
rather than just oversampling with replacement. The minor-
ity class is oversampled by creating new examples along
with the line segments joining any or all of k nearest mi-
nority samples, where k is chosen based on the percentage
of oversampling required (i.e., hyperparameter to the algo-
rithm) (Chawla et al. 2002).
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
We execute the experiments in a GPU enabled Linux ma-
chine with 12GB of RAM and core i7 processor. All super-
vised machine learning algorithms are implemented using
the Python-based Scikit-learn (sci ) library. In addition, we
use Tensorflow (ten ) for the Artificial Neural Network. Due
to resource limitations, instead of using the whole dataset,
we take a stratified sample of the data which is big enough
(i.e., 300K records) for a single GPU enabled commodity
machine. We make the sampled dataset available to the re-
search community at (sam ). Furthermore, we use 70% of
the data for training the models and kept 30% of the data as
a holdout set to test the model. We confirm the target class
had the same ratio in both sets. To avoid the adverse effect of
class imbalance in classification performance, we re-sample
the minority class of the training set using SMOTE (Chawla
et al. 2002) to balance the dataset. However, we do not re-
sample the test set, as real-world data is skewed and over-
sampling the test set could exhibit an overoptimistic perfor-
mance.
We run all supervised machine learning algorithm using
four different approaches:
1. With all features: using all 78 features of the dataset with-
out discarding any features.
2. With selected features: using Random Forest Regres-
sor (adapting with the work of (Sharafaldin, Lashkari,
and Ghorbani 2018)) to select important features of the
dataset, giving us 50 important features having a nonzero
influence on the target variable;
3. With domain knowledge infused features: using infused
domain knowledge features (see Section 3.2), we will use
the term domain features interchangeably to express it in
short form; and
4. With newly constructed features from domain knowl-
edge infused features: using newly constructed features
C, I, and A (see Section 3.2) from domain knowledge
infused features, we will use the term domain features-
constructed interchangeably to express it in short form.
Furthermore, we perform two types of experiments using
each of the four feature settings:
4.2 Explainability Test
For this test, we run six supervised algorithms RF, ET, SVM,
GB, ANN, and NB using the four described feature settings
Table 3: Performance using all features vs selected features
Alg. Acc. Prec. Rec. F-score AUC
RF-A 0.9987 0.9965 0.9971 0.9968 0.9997
RF-S 0.9986 0.9962 0.9966 0.9964 0.9997
0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000
ET-A 0.9981 0.9951 0.9951 0.9951 0.9994
ET-S 0.9980 0.9950 0.9950 0.9950 0.9994
0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
ANN-A 0.9802 0.9155 0.9908 0.9516 0.9984
ANN-S 0.9740 0.8929 0.9860 0.9372 0.9968
0.0062 0.0226 0.0047 0.0145 0.0017
SVM-A 0.9109 0.6996 0.9595 0.8092 0.9780
SVM-S 0.8869 0.6433 0.9565 0.7692 0.9746
0.0239 0.0563 0.0030 0.0400 0.0034
GB-A 0.9960 0.9854 0.9944 0.9899 0.9995
GB-S 0.9957 0.9840 0.9945 0.9892 0.9996
0.0003 0.0014 (0.0001) 0.0007 (0.0001)
NB-A 0.7753 0.4371 0.4888 0.4615 0.8601
NB-S 0.7621 0.4144 0.5019 0.4539 0.8508
0.0132 0.0228 (0.0131) 0.0076 0.0093
and report the results Section 5. Unlike NB, other classifiers
are ”black box” in nature. NB is a probabilistic classifier
based on Bayes Theorem with strong conditional indepen-
dence assumption among features. The main purpose to in-
clude NB in the experiment is the generalizability test.
4.3 Generalizability Test
For testing the generalizability of the approach, we train the
classifier without the representative of a particular attack,
and test it with the presence of the representative of that par-
ticular attack, in order to classify it malicious/benign. To be
more specific, we delete all records of a particular attack
from the training set, train the classifier with the records of
the remaining 13 attacks, and test the classifier with all 14
attacks. We report the percentage of deleted attacks that are
correctly detected as malicious. We repeat this one by one
for all 14 attacks. We make the source code available to the
research community to replicate the experiments at (pro ).
5 Results
The results from our experiments can be broadly categorized
into two categories:
5.1 Findings from Explainability Test
Comparing the performance using all features vs selected
features, (Table 3) shows that models using all features (de-
noted with an appended -A, for instance RF-A) tend to show
better results in terms of all performance metrics. However,
while the difference with the selected features setting is neg-
ligible (<.0007 for RF) for any performance metric, that
might be a result of the elimination of features with little
significance. In addition, Random Forest outperforms other
algorithms SVM, ET, GB, ANN, and NB under this feature
setting (i.e., using all features). So we consider the results
using all features as a baseline to compare with our proposed
approach.
Before starting the comparison of results from our ap-
proach with all features (i.e., baseline), we seek the best
feature setting among two domain related feature settings
of our proposed approach. In other words, in our attempt to
find the better approach among using domain knowledge in-
fused features vs newly constructed features (C, I, and A)
Table 4: Performance using domain features vs constructed
features
Alg. Acc. Prec. Rec. F-score AUC
RF-D1 0.9973 0.9920 0.9945 0.9932 0.9993
RF-D2 0.9511 0.9446 0.7985 0.8654 0.9572
0.0463 0.0475 0.1960 0.1278 0.0421
ET-D1 0.9969 0.9913 0.9932 0.9923 0.9989
ET-D2 0.9756 0.9321 0.9448 0.9384 0.9954
0.0214 0.0592 0.0483 0.0538 0.0036
ANN-D1 0.9497 0.8300 0.9362 0.8799 0.9865
ANN-D2 0.5952 0.3241 0.9721 0.4862 0.7921
0.3544 0.5059 (0.0359) 0.3937 0.1945
SVM-D1 0.8489 0.5747 0.8968 0.7005 0.9252
SVM-D2 0.7195 0.3739 0.6281 0.4687 0.7886
0.1294 0.2008 0.2687 0.2318 0.1366
GB-D1 0.9881 0.9513 0.9904 0.9705 0.9986
GB-D2 0.9230 0.7692 0.8701 0.8165 0.9789
0.0652 0.1821 0.1204 0.1539 0.0198
NB-D1 0.7982 0.4881 0.5028 0.4953 0.8553
NB-D2 0.5591 0.2687 0.7195 0.3913 0.6591
0.2391 0.2194 (0.2167) 0.1040 0.1962
from domain knowledge infused features, we find that, in
almost all cases, the model with domain knowledge infused
features (denoted with an appended -D1, for instance RF-
D1) performs better than the counterpart (see Table 4). Al-
though for RF, the maximum performance gap is .2 in the
recall, for ET that gap is .048 with a similar precision. As
the domain features (22 features) contain a lot more detail
than the newly constructed features C, I, and A (3 features),
it loses few details. In terms of individual algorithms, RF
is again a clear winner this time using domain features. Al-
though NB and ANN exhibit better recall using constructed
features, it comes with compromises in precision. So, over-
all we consider the domain features setting as the best over
the constructed features.
While we know the best feature setting is the all features,
as shown in the comparison of all features vs selected fea-
tures in the Table 3), we also know the best feature setting
domain features from domain features vs constructed fea-
tures (see Table 4). So we further compare the performance
of models using the two best settings all features (i.e., base-
line) vs domain features. We find that, among all models, RF
using all features (denoted with an appended -A, for instance
RF-A) performs better than all other algorithms (see Ta-
ble 5 and Figure 3). Interestingly, RF using domain knowl-
edge infused features (denoted with an appended -D1, for
instance RF-D1) also shows promising performance. The
difference between these two in terms of any performance
metrics is negligible (<.005). In fact, the result of RF us-
ing the domain knowledge infused feature settings is better
than what (Sharafaldin, Lashkari, and Ghorbani 2018) re-
ports using the same dataset. The slight improvement might
stem from the experimental settings (e.g., training test set
split, re-sampling techniques). Furthermore, in the domain
knowledge infused feature setting we are using only 22 fea-
tures out of 78 total, where each feature indicates the asso-
ciated compromises (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, or avail-
ability), capable of producing better explainable and inter-
pretable results compared to the counterpart. The prediction
Table 5: Performance using all features vs domain features
Alg. Acc. Prec. Rec. F-score AUC
RF-A 0.9987 0.9965 0.9971 0.9968 0.9997
RF-D1 0.9973 0.9920 0.9945 0.9932 0.9993
0.0014 0.0045 0.0027 0.0036 0.0004
ET-A 0.9981 0.9951 0.9951 0.9951 0.9994
ET-D1 0.9969 0.9913 0.9932 0.9923 0.9989
0.0011 0.0038 0.0020 0.0029 0.0004
ANN-A 0.9802 0.9155 0.9908 0.9516 0.9984
ANN-D1 0.9497 0.8300 0.9362 0.8799 0.9865
0.0305 0.0855 0.0546 0.0717 0.0119
SVM-A 0.9109 0.6996 0.9595 0.8092 0.9780
SVM-D1 0.8489 0.5747 0.8968 0.7005 0.9252
0.0619 0.1249 0.0627 0.1087 0.0528
GB-A 0.9960 0.9854 0.9944 0.9899 0.9995
GB-D1 0.9881 0.9513 0.9904 0.9705 0.9986
0.0079 0.0341 0.0039 0.0194 0.0009
NB-A 0.7753 0.4371 0.4888 0.4615 0.8601
NB-D1 0.7982 0.4881 0.5028 0.4953 0.8553
(0.0229) (0.0510) (0.0140) (0.0338) 0.0048
for a particular sample can be represented as:
P (D) =
G∑
g=0
contribution(g) (6)
where g is the generalized domain feature (e.g., ACK Flag
Count - C), P(D) is the probability value of the decision.
Instead of using contributions from each of the domain fea-
tures, we can express the output in terms of the contribution
from each element of the domain concept. For that, we need
to aggregate contributions from all features into three groups
(C,I, and A). This will enable an analyst to understand the
nature of the attack more quickly (Figure 2). For instance,
when the greater portion of a feature contribution for a sam-
ple is from features tagged with -A (i.e., Availability) then
it might be a DDoS attack, which usually comes with very
high compromises in Availability of data or service. We use
R’s iml package to generate the sample wise breakdown of
features contribution (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Breakdown of the prediction for a random sample
in terms of C, I, and A.
5.2 Findings from Generalizability Test
Recall that the purpose of this test is to test the resiliency
against unknown attacks. First, we use Random Forest (RF),
Figure 3: Performance deviations of using domain knowl-
edge infused features from baseline
Table 6: Performance of unseen attack detection using RF
Attack Count All(%) Sel.(%) Dom.(%) Cons.(%)
Ddos 4184 99.90 99.90 99.90 62.86
PortScan 4973 99.90 99.94 99.94 66.28
Bot 54 77.78 77.78 75.93 22.22
Infiltration 1 100 100 100 0.00
Web Attack-BF 49 95.92 95.92 91.84 75.51
Web Attack-XSS 23 95.65 95.65 91.30 65.22
Web Attack-Sql 1 0.00 0.00 100 0.00
FTP-Patator 251 99.20 100 99.20 81.67
SSH-Patator 198 98.99 99.49 96.97 75.76
DoS slowloris 188 99.47 99.47 98.94 61.70
DoS Slowloris 174 99.43 99.43 96.55 31.61
Dos Hulk 7319 99.71 99.73 99.34 96.19
DoS GoldenEye 314 99.36 99.68 98.41 85.03
Heartbleed 1 100 100 100 100
the best performing algorithm so far using all four settings of
features. As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4, we see that ex-
cept for the constructed feature settings (denoted by Cons.),
the performances of other feature settings (all, selected, and
domain) are similar. The constructed features fail to provide
comparable performance for RF as it has only three features
and loses lots of detail of data (too much generalization).
Surprisingly, a few unknown attacks are only detectable us-
ing the domain knowledge infused features. For instance,
Web Attack Sql Injection is detected as suspicious only by
domain knowledge infused features. Overall, although the
domain knowledge infused feature setting perform slightly
worse than the all feature setting, it comes with an explain-
able features set with the added capability of identifying a
few unknown attacks.
To reiterate, the constructed features set consists of only
three features (C, I, and A) constructed from aggregating do-
main knowledge infused features. As this feature setting is
composed of only three features, it is an extreme generaliza-
tion of features and it loses a lot of details of data. However,
this time it comes with an exceptional capability which we
realize after applying a statistical approach (Naive Bayes)
on the dataset. We find that (see Table 7), for NB, the newly
constructed feature setting is best as NB is also able to detect
unknown attacks with similar accuracy compared to other
feature settings by RF in Table 6. The most interesting thing
about this capability is that this feature set is composed of
Figure 4: Unknown attack detection rate using Random For-
est
Table 7: Performance of unseen attack detection using NB
Attack Count All(%) Sel.(%) Dom.(%) Cons.(%)
Ddos 4184 76.94 74.59 83.22 100
PortScan 4973 0.18 0.18 6.64 100
Bot 54 0.00 0.00 100
Infiltration 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
Web Attack-BF 49 6.12 6.12 83.67 100
Web Attack-XSS 23 0.00 0.00 95.65 100
Web Attack-Sql 1 100 100 0.00 100
FTP-Patator 251 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.61
SSH-Patator 198 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
DoS slowloris 188 25.53 30.85 38.30 66.49
DoS Slowloris 174 71.26 79.89 75.29 78.16
Dos Hulk 7319 67.78 67.78 67.03 35.37
DoS GoldenEye 314 50.32 65.29 47.13 96.82
Heartbleed 1 100 100 0.00 0.00
only three features (C, I, and A), takes comparatively less
time to execute, and comes with the added benefit of very
good explainability. Once the prediction is expressed as a
percentage of influence from each of C, I, and A, the analyst
would be able to perceive the level of compromise more in-
tuitively from the hints about the type of attack (e.g., DDoS
will show a high percentage of A—compromise in Avail-
ability).
However, from Table 3, 4, and 5, we can see that NB’s
performance comes at a cost of precision and recall (i.e.,
produces comparatively more false positives and false neg-
atives). In addition, NB is a bad probability estimator of
the predicted output (Zhang 2004). However, NB with con-
structed features setting could be recommended as an addi-
tional IDS for quick interpretation of huge traffic data given
the decision is treated as tentative with the requirement of
a further sanity check. We also calculate the average time
taken by each algorithm for all four feature settings and
found that NB is the fastest algorithm. RF, ET, GB, ANN,
and SVM take 2.80, 9.27, 77.06, 15.07, and 444.50 times
more execution time compared to NB. Besides, the best al-
gorithm, RF (1st in terms of the performance metric and 2nd
in terms of execution time), can be executed in parallel using
an Apache Spark for a far better run-time (Chen et al. 2016)
making it highly scalable to big data problems.
Overall, domain knowledge infusion provides better ex-
plainability with negligible compromises in performance. In
addition, the generalization provides better execution time
and resiliency with unknown attacks.
Figure 5: Unknown attack detection rate using Naive Bayes
6 Conclusion and Future Work
AI-based approaches have become an integral part of secu-
rity solutions due to the potential for handling ”big data”
and handling diverse network traffic data. Cybercrime re-
lated damages continue to rise, and network intrusions are
a key tactic. Although AI-based IDS provides accelerated
speeds in intrusion detection, response is still at a human
speed where there is human in the loop. The lack of explain-
ability of an AI-based model is a key reason for this bottle-
neck. To mitigate this problem, we infuse the CIA principle
(i.e., domain knowledge) in the AI-based black box model
for better explainability and generalizability of the model.
Our experimental results show realizable successes in better
explainability with a comprehensive, up to date, and real-
world network intrusion dataset. In addition, the infused do-
main knowledge helps in detecting an unknown attack as it
generalizes the problem, which ultimately opens the door to
accommodate big data.
Going forward, finding an optimal solution to segregate
the contribution of each participating feature (sample wise)
considering interactions (i.e., correlations among features
complicate explanations) among features will aid in better
explainability of an individual prediction (i.e., per sample).
Besides, to ensure trust, estimating the level of uncertainty
in the model will be another extension of this work. There
are some open challenges surrounding explainability and in-
terpretability such as an agreement of what an explanation
is and to whom, a formalism for the explanation, and quan-
tifying the human comprehensibility of the explanation.
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